Formulated The Engineering Thesis in Machine Consciousness, the idea that non-reductive materialism nearly entails the view that first-person consciousness can be engineered in robots [Boltuc 2013, 2012, 2011, 2010, 2009; Boltuc and Boltuc 2007]. Formulated the notion of hard consciousness (h-consciousness) which defines a sub-set of Block's p-consciousness immune to the objection that p-consciousness can be satisfied by cognitive architectures with sensors, which perceive qualia (satisfy a functional definition of first-person consciousness) but fail to realize Nagel’s what it is like effect. Presented the Church-Turing Lover, an argument that even if h-consciousness is epiphenomenal it does not have to make it irrelevant [Boltuc 2010]. Analyzed ways for a deflationary theory of consciousness to void epiphenomenalism [Boltuc 2010A]. Recently argued that h-consciousness is analogous to hardware rather than software [Boltuc 2015]. In other works focused on the Knowledge Argument [Boltuc 1998a, 1998b, 2014]. In his upcoming book he argues in favor of a physicalist deflationary theory of non-reductive consciousness.
Visiting fellow, ANU June-Sept 2014; Visiting fellow, Christchurch Aug. 2014. Fulbright Fellow, Princeton, Jan 1991-Jan 1992. SCR Member, St.John’s, Oxford June-Jul. 1988. Two Ph.D.s: 1. philosophy of mind: The problem of Subject and Object in Anglo-American Philosophy: A Post-Strawsonian Approach (Warsaw University); 2. moral theory: The Ethics of Special Obligations (BGSU). Endowed Chair and Professor of Philosophy, University of Illinois Springfield (at different ranks since 1998). Visiting professor Poznan University 2014 (UAM), Ph.D. seminar on consciousness; Jagiellonian University 2007, M.A seminar in philosophy of mind; Warsaw School of Economics, research professor, 2003-present.