

# Normal and misère play of multiplayer games with preference

Games and Graphs Workshop

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# Background

- Early studies
  - Normal and misère NIM
  - Multiplayer game with preference
    - Includes Li's theory

# Nimber

(3, 2, 4)

011  
010  
100  
-----  
101

·Calculate mod-2 sum of the number of stones of each heap in binary notation without carry

$$3 \oplus 2 \oplus 4 = 5$$

# Normal NIM

P-position of normal NIM:

$$n_1 \oplus n_2 \oplus \dots \oplus n_k = 0$$

# Misère NIM


P-position of misère NIM:

$$\begin{cases} n_1 \oplus n_2 \oplus \dots \oplus n_k = 0 (\exists n_i > 1) \\ n_1 \oplus n_2 \oplus \dots \oplus n_k = 1 (\forall n_i \leq 1) \end{cases}$$


# Background

- Early studies
  - Normal and misère NIM
  - Multiplayer game with preference
    - Includes Li's theory


# 3-player NIM



**First player can't win**






**Third player wins**



**Second player wins**



# Preference



Each player has a total “preference” ordering.

If player  $X$  has preference order  $A > B$  then it is better for  $X$  that player  $A$  **moves last** than player  $B$  moves last.

✘ Assuming players behave optimally for her “preference”.

# Definitions

$N(A)$ : Next player of player  $A$




$N^{-1}(A)$ : Previous player of player  $A$

$$N^2(A) = N(N(A)), N^3(A) = N(N^2(A)), \dots$$

$$N^{-2}(A) = N^{-1}(N^{-1}(A)), N^{-3}(A) = N^{-1}(N^{-2}(A)), \dots$$

Note that  $N^0(A) = N^n(A) = A$ .


# Preference




Each player has a total “preference” ordering.

If player  $X$  has preference order  $A > B$  then it is better for  $X$  that player  $A$  **moves last** than player  $B$  moves last.

✘ Assuming players behave optimally for her “preference”.



A



B




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
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
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
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
$A > N(A) > N^2(A)$




$B > N(B) > N^2(B)$




$C > N(C) > N^2(C)$






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
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
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
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
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



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 :  $A > N(A) > N^2(A)$


 :  $B > N(B) > N^2(B)$

 :  $C > N(C) > N^2(C)$






A




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
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

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
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
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
$A > N(A) > N^2(A)$





$B > N(B) > N^2(B)$





$C > N(C) > N^2(C)$







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
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A



B




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
A





B





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
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





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
 :  $B > N(B) > N^2(B)$

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A



B




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
A



B




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



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
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
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






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
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
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






 :  $A > N(A) > N^2(A)$


 :  $B > N(B) > N^2(B)$


 :  $C > N(C) > N^2(C)$







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
 :  $B > N(B) > N^2(B)$

 :  $C > N(C) > N^2(C)$





A



B




C




A



B




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


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
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




A



B




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
A



B




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



:  $A > N(A) > N^2(A)$


:  $B > N(B) > N^2(B)$


:  $C > N(C) > N^2(C)$







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
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A



B




C




A





B





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


 :  $A > N(A) > N^2(A)$


 :  $B > N(B) > N^2(B)$

 :  $C > N(C) > N^2(C)$





A



B




C




A



B




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


:  $A > N(A) > N^2(A)$


:  $B > N(B) > N^2(B)$

:  $C > N(C) > N^2(C)$





A



B




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

A




B



C




$A > N(A) > N^2(A)$




$B > N(B) > N^2(B)$




$C > N(C) > N^2(C)$






A




B




C





A




B




C




$A > N(A) > N^2(A)$



$B > N(B) > N^2(B)$



$C > N(C) > N^2(C)$



# Definitions

Let  $G$  be a game position. Suppose that  $X$  is the first player of  $G$ . For all player  $X$ , if player  $N^{i-1}(X)$  **moves last**, then  $G$  is called an  $i$ -position.

# Generalized NIM Sum: $\oplus_m$

$$n_1 \oplus_m n_2 \oplus_m \dots \oplus_m n_k$$

Example:  $3 \oplus_3 15 \oplus_3 13 \oplus_3 11$

3

15

13

11

$3 \oplus_3 15 \oplus_3 13 \oplus_3 11$

# Generalized NIM Sum: $\oplus_m$

$$n_1 \oplus_m n_2 \oplus_m \dots \oplus_m n_k$$

Example:  $3 \oplus_3 15 \oplus_3 13 \oplus_3 11$

3  0011

15  1111

13  1101

11  1011

$3 \oplus_3 15 \oplus_3 13 \oplus_3 11$

# Generalized NIM Sum: $\oplus_m$

$$n_1 \oplus_m n_2 \oplus_m \dots \oplus_m n_k$$

Example:  $3 \oplus_3 15 \oplus_3 13 \oplus_3 11$



$3 \oplus_3 15 \oplus_3 13 \oplus_3 11$



# Generalized NIM Sum: $\oplus_m$

$$n_1 \oplus_m n_2 \oplus_m \dots \oplus_m n_k$$

Example:  $3 \oplus_3 15 \oplus_3 13 \oplus_3 11$



$3 \oplus_3 15 \oplus_3 13 \oplus_3 11 \rightarrow "0201"$

# $m$ -player normal NIM

If for all player  $X$ , her preference order is

$$X > N(X) > \dots > N^{m-1}(X),$$

then NIM position is a 0–position( $m$ –position) if and only if

$$n_1 \oplus_m n_2 \oplus_m \dots \oplus_m n_k = "00 \dots 00"$$

⌘ Note that this result includes the theory of two-player normal play.

S.-Y Robert Li. N-person Nim and N-person Moore's Games.  
Internat. J. Game Theory, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp.31-36, 1978.

**New result**

# When does worst player take last stone?

normal play:

$$n_1 \oplus n_2 \oplus \dots \oplus n_k = 0$$

misère play:


$$\begin{cases} n_1 \oplus n_2 \oplus \dots \oplus n_k = 0 (\exists n_i > 1) \\ n_1 \oplus n_2 \oplus \dots \oplus n_k = 1 (\forall n_i \leq 1) \end{cases}$$

$$m = 2$$

$m$ -player normal play:

$$n_1 \oplus_m n_2 \oplus_m \dots \oplus_m n_k = "00 \dots 00"$$

# When does worst player take last stone?



# New result: $m$ -player misère play




Theorem:

Assume that for all integer  $j$  and for all player  $X$ , her preference order is

$$N^j(X) > N^{j+1}(X) > \dots > N^{m-1}(X) > X > N(X) \dots > N^{j-1}(X),$$

then  $(n_1, n_2, \dots, n_{k-1}, n_k)$  is a  $j$ -position if and only if

$$\begin{cases} n_1 \oplus_m n_2 \oplus_m \dots \oplus_m n_k = "00 \dots 00" (\exists n_i > 1) \\ n_1 \oplus_m n_2 \oplus_m \dots \oplus_m n_k = "00 \dots 0^j" (\forall n_i \leq 1) \end{cases}$$



# New result: $m$ -player misère play

Theorem:

Assume that for all integer  $j$  and for all player  $X$ , her preference order is

$$N^j(X) > N^{j+1}(X) > \dots > N^{m-1}(X) > X > N(X) \dots > N^{j-1}(X),$$

then  $(n_1, n_2, \dots, n_{k-1}, n_k)$  is a  $j$ -position if and only if

$$\begin{cases} n_1 \oplus_m n_2 \oplus_m \dots \oplus_m n_k = \text{"00 ... 00"} (\exists n_i > 1) \\ n_1 \oplus_m n_2 \oplus_m \dots \oplus_m n_k = \text{"00 ... 0}^j \text{"} (\forall n_i \leq 1) \end{cases}$$



This result includes two-  
player misère NIM by  
 $m = 2$  and  $j = 1$

# Two-player misère NIM

Theorem:

Assume that for all integer  $j$  and for all player  $X$ , her preference order is

$$N^j(X) > N^{j+1}(X) > \dots > N^{m-1}(X) > X > N(X) \dots > N^{j-1}(X),$$

then  $(n_1, n_2, \dots, n_{k-1}, n_k)$  is a  $j$ -position if and only if

$$\begin{cases} n_1 \oplus_m n_2 \oplus_m \dots \oplus_m n_k = \text{"00 ... 00"} (\exists n_i > 1) \\ n_1 \oplus_m n_2 \oplus_m \dots \oplus_m n_k = \text{"00 ... 0}^j \text{"} (\forall n_i \leq 1) \end{cases}$$

# Two-player misère NIM

Theorem:

Assume that for all player  $X$ , her preference order is

$$N^1(X) > X$$

then  $(n_1, n_2, \dots, n_{k-1}, n_k)$  is a **1**-position if and only if

$$\begin{cases} n_1 \oplus_2 n_2 \oplus_2 \dots \oplus_2 n_k = "00 \dots 00" (\exists n_i > 1) \\ n_1 \oplus_2 n_2 \oplus_2 \dots \oplus_2 n_k = "00 \dots 01" (\forall n_i \leq 1) \end{cases}$$

This result also includes  
multiplayer normal NIM  
by  $j = 0$

# Multiplayer normal NIM

Theorem:

Assume that for all integer  $j$  and for all player  $X$ , her preference order is

$$N^j(X) > N^{j+1}(X) > \dots > N^{m-1}(X) > X > N(X) \dots > N^{j-1}(X),$$

then  $(n_1, n_2, \dots, n_{k-1}, n_k)$  is a  $j$ -position if and only if

$$\begin{cases} n_1 \oplus_m n_2 \oplus_m \dots \oplus_m n_k = "00 \dots 00" (\exists n_i > 1) \\ n_1 \oplus_m n_2 \oplus_m \dots \oplus_m n_k = "00 \dots 0^j" (\forall n_i \leq 1) \end{cases}$$

# Multiplayer normal NIM

Theorem:


Assume that for all player  $X$ , her preference order is

$$X > N(X) > \dots > N^{m-1}(X),$$

then  $(n_1, n_2, \dots, n_{k-1}, n_k)$  is a **0**-position if and only if

$$\begin{cases} n_1 \oplus_m n_2 \oplus_m \dots \oplus_m n_k = \text{"00 ... 00"} (\exists n_i > 1) \\ n_1 \oplus_m n_2 \oplus_m \dots \oplus_m n_k = \text{"00 ... 0**0**"} (\forall n_i \leq 1) \end{cases}$$

# When does worst player take last stone?



# Another theorem

Theorem:

Assume that for all integer  $j$  and for each player  $X$ , her preference order is

$$N^j(X) > N^{j-1}(X) > \dots > N(X) > X > N^{m-1}(X) \dots > N^{j+1}(X),$$

then for all integer  $n_1, n_2, \dots, n_{k-1}$ , there is an exactly one integer  $n_k$  such that NIM position  $(n_1, n_2, \dots, n_{k-1}, n_k)$  is a  $j$ -position.



# Future problems

1. Another preferences

2. Another games

1. Moore's game, LIM, WYTHOFF, Graph Games,...